2015

EURODEFENSE

Rencontre des Présidents Presidents Meeting



Bruxelles / Brussels 23-24-25 APR 2015

Cover Photo taken at Zutendaal From left to right

- 1. Alan SARMAN 2. Guido MAENE 3. Ose DIETER 4. Philippe ROGER 5. John Howe
- 6. Jean-Paul PERRUCHE 7. Renaud BELLAIS 8. Elsa SCHRIER 9. Willy HERTELEER
- 10. Régine BRUNEAU 11. Jean GUINARD 12. Wim VAN EEKELEN 13. Marc MARTIN
- 14. Frederico YANIZ 15. Augusto MELO CORREIA 16. Miguel FRADIQUE DA SII
- 17. Maurice DE LANGOIS 18. Manuel BRETON 19. Thierry JACOBS
- 20. FN HERSTAL-briefer 21. Ernst VAN HOEK

Rencontre des Présidents EURODEFENSE Presidents Meeting EURODEFENSE

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Participants

from the EURODEFENSE Associations



EURODEFENSE

Général (Ret) Jean GUINARD, Secrétaire Général



AUSTRIA

Dr. Minister Werner FASSLABEND (President)
Dr. Arnold KAMMEL



BELGIUM

Admiral (Ret) Willy HERTELEER (President)

Rear Admiral (Ret) Jacques ROSIERS, Vice-President

Mr. Thierry JACOBS Dr. Octàvia FROTA

Mrs. Régine BRUNEAU



FRANCE

Général (Ret) Jean Paul PERUCHE (Président)

Général (Ret) Maurice DE LANGLOIS

Mr. Renaud BELLAIS Mr. Philippe ROGER



GERMANY

Dr. Dieter OSE



LUXEMBOURG

Dr. Marc MARTIN



NETHERLANDS

Mr. Minister Wim van EEKELEN, President

Mrs. Elsa SCHRIER

Mr. Ernst VAN HOEK



PORTUGAL

General (Ret) Augusto MELO CORREIA, Vice-President Mr. Miguel FRADIQUE DA SILVA, Secretary General



SPAIN

General (Ret) Federico YANIZ Mr. Manuel BRETÓN, Secretary General



UNITED KINGDOM

Mr. John HOWE, President

Mr. Alan SHARMAN

Ice Breaker














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Seminar



The title

How to convince for a reasonable Defense Effort

The question

For the seminar, from NATO, for the Operational planning we are looking for experts from the Allied Command Operations (ACO) to address generic Concepts of Operations, General Defense Plans over specific Operational Planning to the promulgation of Operation Orders and Force Generation conferences. For the Defense Planning, experts from Allied Command Transformation and from the NATO International Staff to explain the cycle of Force Goals and Force Objectives to the Defense Planning Questionnaires and their answers to the defense Review process and the Country Chapters explaining the subsequent role of the Conference of the National Armament Directors

For the European Union, from the International Military Staff, experts to explain their approach to Operational Planning maybe starting from the Petersburg tasks to the situation in the EU neighborhood and the designation of the Operational Command/Control Authority to the Operation Order and the Force Generation. For the defense Planning, experts from the European Defense Agency maybe starting from headline goals tapping into the NATO Defense Planning process and taking principally into account the defense planning of the Nations.

We also invited experts from the Belgian Defense Staff to explain a national approach to the Military Operational and Defense Planning and how those processes are influenced by NATO and by EU organizations; for the former we will approach the Assistant Chief of Staff Operations/Training and for the latter the Assistant Chief of Staff Strategy to obtain the experts.

Introduction

How do you convince a sensible man in the street that it would be wise for him to spend two percent of his income on defense? How does a Minister of Defense convince the members of his party or of his majority in parliament of this wisdom on a national scale?

- A Nation that has to travel a guarter of the world to find that threat the same the same 2%?
- For those that have a national nuclear deterrence and for those that have not the same 2%?

Simplicity is often a virtue and not a vice, but here it doesn't work, at least the message finds no followers among those to whom it is addressed. For more than twenty years now, the cry for a "at least 2% defense effort" is not heard and if heard not followed by most member states of the Alliance and of the Union. "I have to do it because he does it" has never been a convincing argument.

During the four decades of the Cold War the defense effort was justified by the openly declared policy of the Soviet Union that they intended to install communism, if need be by force, also in at least the rest of Europe. To show the capacity to defeat or to stop the Soviet Armed Forces dictated the size of our defense effort. Those Soviet Armed Forces were defined in quantity and quality by NATO agreed intelligence. We now know that in quality their performance was greatly over estimated. Based on that intelligence the three Major NATO Commanders developed "Concepts of Operations" and "General Defense Plans". Those concepts and plans, the result of operational planning, served to define the overall Armed Forces that NATO needed in wartime, and that was the starting point of the elaborate "NATO Defense Planning cycle" defining the "Force Goals". Bilateral and multilateral discussions between on the one hand the Alliance and the Allies and on the other hand the Nation concerned resulted in a very detailed questionnaire (DPQ). The questions address finance, personnel, equipment as well as mobilization and sustainment issues. History, tradition, preferences and planning of the Nation were taken into account. The questionnaire did confront the nation with a "reasonable investment challenge". The evaluation of the answers of the Nation results in the "Country Chapter".

The disappearance of the Soviet Union and of the direct threat on NATO territory meant the end of this logical approach of the result of Operational Planning underpinning the Defense Planning. Defining the tasks and then defining the tool(s) to execute them.

How is this done today? In NATO? In the EUROPEAN UNION? Nationally?

A posteriori reflections based on the presentations.

The crisis management or crisis response systems in NATO and in the EU are adequate tools for the planning of necessary operations in the immediate future but not for underpinning the Defense Planning in the long run. The international planning of a military operation is done having the available military capabilities, joint and combined, in mind. The planning of a military operation is not the "Operational planning" needed to support "Defense Planning.

"Operational Planning" is preparing for the further future, imagined (worst case) scenarios; trying to see what military posture, what military capabilities will be needed to secure our defense and security.

- Operational Commands should be allowed, tasked even, to make generic plans for worst-case scenarios such as stop militarily the Russia of Putin in the Ukraine, reconquer the Crimea, deter effectively that Russia in the NATO Nations bordering it. This generic operational planning should be done on firm, up to date intelligence and be very specific identifying the military capabilities, what and where, required. The way this was done during the Cold War in relation to the threat generated by the Soviet Union can serve as an example.
- This type of "Operational Planning" is, of course, also a political signal, in many cases a useful signal. NATO and the EU do not have a history of military planning and the planning considered is of a defensive nature. For the political authorities, to be able to decide, need the results of this type of planning. And those results would correctly underpin the Defense Planning.


NATO Operational Planning


by Colonel GS Jean-Marc VERMEULEN, ACO
























NATO Defence Planning

by Rear Admiral Paolo SANDALLI, International Military Staff













Objectives of NDPP

Better alignment with overarching Alliance priorities




- Better integration among the various planning disciplines
- Better identification of shortfall capabilities
- Better alignment of national, multinational and common-funded activities
- · Improved prioritisation mechanisms
- Improved implementation management




Military Staff

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Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) and NDPP collective targets

The Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) is the senior North Atlantic Council (NAC) body responsible for the promotion of Armaments Cooperation in the Alliance.

Mainly involved in NDPP Step 4, facilitate Implementation

NDPP Targets can be National, (Multi-National), and Collective

Tasks under NATO Collective Targets deliver a NATO product

A number of targets / tasks have been allocated to CNAD and its supporting structure, which will require actions both in CNAD and in the Nations (to support CNAD)

International Military Staff

Collective Targets present the opportunity to link CNAD activities to NATO Defence Planning top-down guidance

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



EU Operational Planning


by Brigade General Daniel GRAMMATICO, European Union Military Staff


















EU Defence Planning

by Mr Axel BUTENSCHÖN, European Defence Agency





The Capability Development Plan

Initially endorsed in **July 2008 Revised in 2014**



- 'Overall strategic tool', informing Member States defence planning and driving EDA WP
- Connecting short-, medium- and longer-term capability needs
- Not a 'Force Plan', but informing on future Capability needs
- Agreed Priorities
- CDP reference tool web accessible









https://cdp.eda.europa.eu

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
The new CDP as a reference for national decision








Joint staff decision

www.eda.europa.eu









CDP Priority Actions October 2014

Gaining Information Superiority

- Counter Cyber Threats
- Provide SATCOM capabilities
- Enhance Battlespace Information & Communication Services
- Remotely Piloted Aircraft providing Surveillance (RPAS)

Protection of Forces in Theatre

- Enhance C-IED & CBRNe capabilities in Operations
- Provide Air & Missile defence for deployable forces



Enabling Expeditionary Operations

- Inter-Theatre Air capabilities
- Intra-Theatre Combat capabilities
- Enhance Logistic Support for Deployed Forces
- Provide Medical Support to Operations

Securing Sea Lines of Communication

- Maritime Patrolling & Escorting
- Naval Surveillance systems

Cross-Cutting drivers

- Energy & Environmental protection
- SESAR
- Modelling, Simulation & Experimentation
- Space-based information systems

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CDP Revision 2014

Belgian Operational Planning

by Lieutenant General Marc COMPERNOL,
Assitant Chief of Staff Operations & Training











Belgian Operational Planning

- · Strategic overwatch
- · Political orientation
- · Participate in the multinational planning
 - added value
 - clear cut mission
 - exit strategy
- Pending political approval (timings!)
- · Provide inputs (RoE, CJSOR,...)
- Operations & training Staff
 - JOPG
 - Operational Support (Med, Strat lift, Log,...)

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Planning Belgian operations

- · Additional planning criterions
 - Balance NATO / EU / UN
 - Balance Op tempo units
 - Swift engagement FOC units
 - Overstreched capabilities (Heli, airlift)
- Iterative process
 - Winter: start
 - Spring: proposal to CHOD
 - Summer: proposal to MoD
 - Fall: final political approval
- Challenges
 - Geographical dispersal
 - Medical support
 - Budget

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Ops vs. Capability Planning

- Generic Belgian capabilities design
- EU and NATO planning factors
- Lessons Identified & Urgent Operational Requirements (CUR)

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Challenges for small countries




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
Belgian Defence Planning


by Colonel GS Geert LEEMAN, Chief of the Strategic Planning Section in the Strategy Departement
















Strategic Planning - Belgian Defence


A Strategic Plan for the Modernisation of the Belgian Armed Forces 2000 – 2015.

The Belgian Armed Forces <u>will adapt</u> to the new situation <u>in the coming 15 years</u> based on the following general principles:

- A <u>progressive convergence towards</u> a conglomerate of <u>comparable</u> <u>countries</u> is the underpinning basic philosophy shaping the structure of the defence effort.
- Such a long term objective requires <u>stable budgetary planning</u> <u>assumptions</u> in order to be able to establish the necessary long term investment plan. The Government decided <u>to adapt the defence budget to</u> <u>inflation in the coming 15 years</u>.
- Within a period of 6 to 7 years, the 3 components of the budget will be in balance again, allowing for an <u>investment level of about 25%.</u>
- The <u>total strength of defence personnel</u> will be <u>reduced to 39.500</u>, from the actual 44.000, by 2015.









Some observations...

- The main condition for an effective execution of a strategic plan (a stable budgetary framework) has never been honoured by the successive Belgian federal governments. This resulted in a spiral of successive corrective top-down measures inspired by pragmatism and budgetary reasoning with ever less personnel/capabilities and freedom for investment.
- The required strategic long term planning has been replaced by a short term, pragmatic and budgetary inspired approach resulting in ad hoc decisions (mainly platform oriented in stead of a conceptual approach) and additional staff work.

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Way ahead...

- Design a transparent methodology and structural implementation tailored to the future size of the Belgian Defence
- Integrate the multilateral guidance (NATO/NDPP and EU/CDP
- Optimize the regional/clustered alignment of Defence planning
- Establish a stable budgetary planning framework with a sufficient bandwidth for investments
- From a resource driven pragmatic approach towards a broader capability based design (optimizing all LoD)
- Improve the quality and frequency of strategic political military dialogue and societal interaction
- Desired end state: a new Strategic Plan supported by a stable and coherent rolling investment plan over 10 years (Program law) based upon a clear long term vision for defence

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Questions?



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Q&A session

moderated by Colonel GS Guido MAENE, MSc Eng, Director-General Royal Higher Institute for Defence

