

FUTURES AND CAPABILITIES

At the meeting of the Presidents in Vienna on the 21st May 2009, Spain made a proposal to start a study on scenarios and capabilities, departing as food for thought from the NATO "Multiple Futures Project Report" (MFP).

At the end of the meeting the name of the accepted subject was "Futures and Capabilities".

Before last summer another paper on this subject was distributed, where we explained and elaborated on the purpose and scope of the new EWG, labeled as EWG 14,.

At the XV International Meeting of Eurodefense, last September in London, a working session (9th sept) was held to collect reactions to the initial ideas and to ascertain if a sufficient number of participants were recruited. The working session was positive and very constructive but not highly attended, due to the conflict with other meetings that were held at the same time. France and Spain did attend, and a broad and positive discussion took place about the way ahead that included criticisms to some aspects of the MFR Report.

Also, France and Spain agreed that Eurodefense-España should issue a paper in order to clarify the interest of other possible nations to participate, as well as some key ideas that should be considered on our way ahead:

- "Futures and Capabilities" should take into account that within the 2030 horizon there should be changes concerning the ESDP with respect to:
 - The autonomy of EU as a potential global actor.
 - The expected level of ambition in respect current missions. (Expansion of Petesberg missions)
 - The relations EU- NATO and US-EU.

At the final session of the London International Meeting a status report was presented to the Sec Gen in the presence of all attendees including all these points.

Austria, Belgian, Germany, Greece and Portugal expressed their intention to participate in the EWG. It is expected that other members will join the Group after receiving this paper. With these nations participating together with France and Spain, there is already a sufficient mass to keep moving.

At the time to get started, it is important to establish a methodology proposed and some common references. Of course, other approaches can be considered at this initial stage if so decided by a majority. In fact, some of the references were suggested by members of Eurodefense after the launching of this initiative by Spain, all very constructive and welcome.

With respect to the references:

Before the London meeting we welcome the suggestion of using as a reference the document known as "AN INITIAL LONG-TERM VISION FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY NEEDS" issued by the European Defence Agency (October 2006).

On May the 8th of 2009, the MFP final report was released by the Allied Command Transformation (ACT). This report provided some possible futures against which to confront EU capabilities. Therefore, it gives us a more updated view on the 2030 horizon than the one used to develop the EDA vision.

On July 2009, the EU Institute for Security Studies released an extensive paper titled "What ambitions for European defense in 2020?" This document, produced on the tenth anniversary of ESDP, is an important contribution to the strategic debate ahead. It covers a variety of options with respect to EU ambitions, autonomy and relations from different perspectives.

The recent approval of the Lisbon Treaty opens a new period of positive developments for the EU and more specifically for the ESDP; therefore, the provisions of the Treaty are a due reference for our EWG.

With respect to methodology:

The goal is to produce a paper on "Futures and capabilities" which will address a Long-term vision - including ambitions, autonomy and relations -, updated with the references aforementioned and together with the own specific view of the members participating in the EWG.

In order to establish a timetable allowing us to have the first draft by the next Eurodefense International Meeting, we proposed some initial key ideas to see if we can have a common approach, in a broad sense, on the ambitions and role of EU in the ESDP dimension within the 2020 timeframe.

As far as scenarios, we suggest to depart from the MFP Implications and Deduction Process phase of the study, screening the most challenging scenarios ahead.

Finally, we plan to match ambitions and scenarios to compare the capabilities included in EDA studies and current EU goals, so as to determine consistencies, shortfalls and the most evident gaps.

Annex

Ambitions, Autonomy, Relations

The purpose of this annex is to foster the discussion on the EU autonomy, level of ambition as well as on NATO and US relations, using the EU ISS document key ideas as a reference:

- 2009 marks the tenth anniversary of ESDP.
- EU is playing a crucial role in stability (22 missions, Congo, Chad, Balkans, Georgia, etc)
- Crisis management capacity is crucial to strengthen EU as a global actor. The strength of moral and legal legitimacy derives from consensual basis and civil-military approach to crisis. Concept developed ahead of others.
- The Lisbon Treaty will provide a new momentum and more flexibility to ESDP.
- There is a gap between ambitions and reality. Greater European defense integration and cooperation is needed.
- Need to update partnerships with UN, OSCE, AU (African Union), US and to balance relations with NATO.
- The EU is not a military alliance. Value of ESDP lies on its broader approach to security. EU must be adaptable and flexible in terms of engagement. ESDP as an ever-advancing process must identify challenges to address them.

1998 The St. Malo's Declaration put in motion European defence and gave EU a move into autonomy and credibility and to add muscle to military cooperation.

Eleven years later, looking into 2020 what should be the ambitions in security?

The success or failure of the "Obama experiment" is unpredictable. Will the multilateral vision turn into political reality?

Multilateralising multipolarity will bring a world governed by norms - as it is adequate for the European model - or will it lead to a competition among big powers?

Futures depict a high level of unpredictability. So, what we would like to happen as a noble ambition?

Some general thoughts: The EU is a construction against the past in a perpetual changing process and with an undefined ultimate goal. The European project consists on the building of a space where peace and democracy reign supreme.

The EU international identity will reflect its internal identity.

The importance of the EU as a normative power has to be underlined.. The improbability of military confrontation among the major global players leads to conduct business in a different way, using soft power instruments for persuasion rather than force. The International agenda is more influenced by human developments, including the protection of individuals against any kind of violence, than by Security concerns.

The European Union will remain a civilian power, but hopefully one with a commensurate military capability. Need for a balanced combination of soft and hard power. Building a European army to pursue European interest “by other means” is not on the cards for the time being.

The article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty states that should one of its member countries be “the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power”. This statement of the obvious should be a basic principle of EU further integration.

For the time being subsidiarity, doing together what is best done together leaving the capitals what they do best in their own.

ESDP is a basic security tool indispensable to the conduct of foreign policy, is instrumental in achieving major goals, instrument of broader strategic objectives: to bolster European integration, to bring about peace and democracy into the neighborhood.

Is EU a regional or a global actor “able to act wherever challenges to international peace will arise”?

Of course, further EU internal integration and neighborhood influence are needed, but there is also the need of a global dimension. To speak around the world on behalf of 27 countries is something that cannot be justified for purely regional aspirations.

To influence the world, the EU must strengthen its ties with other global players. This requires a role as security provider, the only way to promote a relationship of equals with the United States, among others.

A truly global status inevitably requires a commensurate global security dimension, and sharing a “common humanity” calls for the use of force to stop mass atrocities. So, ESDP must not just focus on peace keeping but also on peacemaking operations.

Reliance on the EU is based on “multilateralising multipolarity”, which requires to building of a system of universally accepted rules and norms as a base for common efforts and the sharing of the burden of resolving global and regional issues”. Global and regional players engage in strategic cooperation frameworks.

The world will change dramatically in the next ten years. The alliance of EU with the US is indispensable, with a bilateral agenda which is much broader than NATO. “The west needs the rest”. NATO is not the only option. The EU main partner outside NATO may sometimes be the US, but India, China, the African Union, etc. may as well.

A strong ESDP is in America’s interest. This means a renewal of the strategic ambition, including a way to act autonomously from NATO. But there is not credibility without legitimacy and effectiveness:

There is a gap between CFSP and ESDP. The progress on defence has been much faster and of a higher profile than the progress in common foreign policy.

There is a deficit of coherence between different EU institutions and between EU defined policy and member States’ policies.

There is a joint capability deficit, in contradiction with ESDP mission statement. The need exists of spending better and in a more coordinated manner.

Legitimacy is at the heart of ESDP. This is not an issue at present. A permanent structured cooperation opened to a limited number of “able and willing” countries opens a new stage.

Perceptions on the legitimacy of the use of force have evolved, as we have evolved from the Westphalian horizontal competition among peers towards the vertical asymmetric tensions of the globalised world village.

This evolution is taking place not only because we need to manage new aspects as cyberwarfare, but because into the horizon of 2020 high intensity combat, the use of “unleashed kinetic violence” will be probably limited to surgical actions or focused destruction for specialized tasks, rather than to large scale operations.

The most generalized use of force will be “leashed kinetic violence” to influence rather than to destroy the opponent; consequently, violence will be tailored to the psychological objective. In summary, this can be achieved in two ways:

- Boots on the ground (BOG): from consensual Peace Keeping to Enforcement.
- Regional and Global Policing: the use of military force for law enforcement, barrier operations and rescue and evacuation. (Fisheries protection, barrier against smuggling and illegal migration, piracy, etc...) By 2020 their importance, and particularly that of ecological protection missions, will grow considerably. Whether these tasks belong to the military or other organizations must be clarified, but the demands of these robust policing tasks remain the same.

Military Foreign Policy Support operations and BOG (!) have been defined as wars among the people, a new and very complex scenario.

The forecast of ESDP by 2020 shall include the building blocks of military efficiency:

- The will of leadership, soldiers and society to use force when necessary. Will the EU (leaders, society) retain the will to maintain and use high intensity military violence by 2020?
- The skill to apply that will. (Training, interoperability, joint operations)
- Tools to implement their decisions. (Commands, capabilities)

Will, skill and tools deserve further elaboration in the next draft, as they will be basic to the ambitions of EU.

Ambitions for the future are found on decisions to forge tomorrow’s realities.

If Europe does have aspirations for 2020, the only way to progress is through a shared political will. Is the share of a common destiny on the table? A common destiny means a common responsibility for Defense and Security. In the long term, this should be an aspiration. It will take several generations to achieve the objective of a common political authority. To become a full partner of the US, it is very important that, as we progress in that particular way, we are perceived as one Europe by the other side of the Atlantic. That will change the EU –NATO relationship and lead to the necessary decision making autonomy of both sides.

A Permanent structured cooperation and an enhanced cooperation will add flexibility to ESDP (1/3 of member states to launch an operation) for the time being, while, in the coming decade, the focus of ESDP missions will remain more likely on the management of crisis outside the EU from the hot phase to their stabilization. With respect to the solidarity clause, cooperation to prevent

terrorism and, on request, assistance following terrorist's attacks and natural disasters will cover its provisions.

The operational credibility of ESDP shall add, to its unquestionable legitimacy, the necessary effectiveness to protect the interests of the European Union.

Right now, the EU is a democratic process, not a finished political actor. The consolidation of the EU is gradually deepening, but the process is slow and cumbersome; therefore, weakness is likely to persist until 2020.

The future depends much on the ability of the EU to act differently and according to its founding principles, that is, merging soft power and hard power into "smart power", and convincing others - ideally, all others - to act just as much differently in the conduct of international relations.

To finish with this brainstorming on the first reference, I include a very short summary of the conclusions offered by the President of the EU ISS on ambitions for European Defence in 2020, as well as a roadmap:

- The European Union needs a twin robust civilian and military capacity, recognizing the deficit in policy consistency and filling the capability gap.
- The EU must be prepared to act jointly and autonomously with decisions taken within its framework.
- EU Member States will remain aware that the EU's distinctive civil-military profile is suited to meet the challenges of the future and should assume the principle that there is 'no normative power without "real" power'.
- There is a need to improve technical cooperation between ESDP and NATO having in mind that the primary Euro-Atlantic partnership is between the US and EU.

Roadmap to progress:

Crisis management today—common defence beyond 2020. (Expanded Petesberg tasks can be defined as 'anything but collective defence')

A human security doctrine may require the use of the force. (There is no contradiction between the notion of human security and undertaking the full range of military operations, including peace enforcement)

Civilian and 'force generation' goals must be met. (Develop a robust and effective military and civilian EU Peace Corps for crisis management)

Foster the case for a single European defence market and joint procurement. (In Europe the defense market is characterized by fragmentation, a lack of transparency and lack of competition)

Prioritizing the European military and civilian command.(New Structures as a formal Council of Defence Ministers, a European Security and Defence College, a Command to plan and conduct the Union`s military operations...)

Developing a perspective on the role of NATO (Common position on the future of NATO on its Strategic Concept, more effective and dynamic cooperation, a stronger EU-US strategic relationship)

Creating a European Parliamentary Council for Security and Defence (Democratic control of ESDP is becoming an Issue)

Building an `open` ESDP (Cooperation with the US within or in most cases outside NATO but also with other States and regional organizations, develop of effective multilateral cooperation, missions in the framework of the UN)

Overcoming the political deficit: putting coherence first (Clear cut-strategy for international action, global political role on the international stage)

Inclusiveness is a prerequisite for legitimacy (Move forward with the military dimension of ESDP through the Permanent Structured Cooperation open to all Member States on the basis of well-defined and well-publicized convergence criteria, ambitions for 2020 not a mini-defence project but a powerful foreign, security and defence policy able to pull together the weight of all member States and of all European institutions)

Annex MFP (comments at page 25)

On May 8th 2009 the NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) released the Final Report on its MFP. The timing of this release fits perfectly with the work NATO is going to start on the New Strategic Concept.

Those who try to know in detail the report will find in the ACT NATO web page the Report, an abridged version on Findings and Recommendations including military advice, and Annexes with the background on methodology, workshops, roundtables and research by the NATO team.


MFP is not intended as a crystal ball to predict the future of 2030 but to create a basis for strategic dialogue on future challenges, their relative nature and gravity. MFP arrives to different ways future might unfold. Arrives to four equally plausible futures in 2030. These futures suppose threats and challenges which pose risk to the interest, values and population of the Alliance.

Within the purpose or aim of this working group is to determine whether some of these risks situations will be more likely or especially affecting EU. To do it may be out of the NATO umbrella. At the same time to find out what are the

essential capabilities, associated to those unpredictable but possible risks scenarios and to compare them to key capabilities shortfalls identified years ago and still unfilled today. To determine if gaps between ends and means to fulfill the European Security Strategy (ESS) are approaching or getting apart. These are only some possibilities to select among other choices.

In summary MFP may confirm key capabilities shortfalls already identified, add new ones either due to new risks in the horizon or to a wider range of tasks foreseeable in ESDP progress. The exercise of the WG 14 will be useful to stress and understand gaps between ambitions and means of EU member-states to deliver on them, and on what EU essentially lacks to achieve the capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces, means to decide to use them, and readiness to respond to crisis. Reflections on tasks may open some issues like the complementary role of EU in respect NATO or added value of a strong European pillar within NATO very alive in current international politics.

Coming to the reference study, the MFP methodology begins defining drivers which produce possible outcomes from their possible different interaction.



In fact from 9 drivers the model arrives to 4 futures which lead to 40 risk conditions, 33 security implications and 26 military implications.


We consider it will be prudent to depart at some point of the “Implications Deduction Process”, accepting the intellectual framework leading to that phase. Our starting point might be to filter some Security and Military implications with EU lenses, eliminating those which clearly belong to NATO, if we might consider such a case, and including the most probable from an EU perspective. Anyway this is but one choice put on the table to your consideration. The subject is open to generic or specific approaches you may select to elaborate on them. It will be welcome to know the degree of credibility you assign to the methodology use by MFP and weaknesses you may identify.

To stimulate the interest in MFP and to avoid long cross checking with reference documents, we will introduce some graphics and parts of the report

that are self explanatory and try to promote interest and acquaintance with the model.

DRIVERS


Globalisation	Further accelerates	Remains constant	slows	reverses
Governance	Ardent Nationalism	NSAs / Corporations dominant	Weak nations Strong NSAs	World Governance
Energy & Resources	Demand increases not met	Spot scarcity of resources, energy expensive	Supply & Demand level off	Future Global resource glut
Urbanisation	Move to cities increases	Cities grow at same rate as populations	City growth slows	Population flight from cities
Demographics	Old West Young East no migration	massive west migration by young east	West population decline	Young east population bulge
Terrorism	Attacks increase	Attacks more "unconventional"	Attacks decline	NBC attack
Technology	Tech solutions accelerate	Tech advance rate stable	Weak tech advances	Tech advances stop
Environment	Global Warming	Desertification of parts of Earth	Loss of Ecosystems & Habitat	Environmental quality improves
Networks & Communications	Networks improve global connectivity	Networks hampered by cyber vulnerabilities	Network superior foe exploits use against NATO	Networks exacerbate have vs. have not



Different drivers with different level of likelihood and impact might lead to four possible futures.

The results of many workshops on this research (annexes of Final Report) lead to four futures.

STRUCTURAL DRIVER'S 'CUBE' – NOTIONAL EXAMPLES



Note1 The Box

The four futures are fleshed out with the deterministic drivers using the structural drivers as a backdrop against which to test and locate the futures. The box in effect describes which kinds of relations are possible in a given situation in the international system between states, groups of states, or other major actors. Each point within a box is a kind of bilateral international relation determined by three vectors (friction, integration, and asymmetry). This is a crucial aspect, as these major kinds of relations define the potential and possible outcomes within a given future. In other words, these relationships enable a description of an overall space in international relations

Consequently, all the four futures can be placed within this three-dimensional space. The futures were designed to be mutually exclusive in terms of the three dimensions and the box acts as a kind of quality control. It demonstrates that the futures aggregately account for – or take up – much of its space. The futures are thus mutually exclusive in terms of the fundamental dimensions of the box. However, this concept of mutual exclusivity is inaccurate with respect to the likelihood that one of the futures will end up as the future; rather it is likely that elements from all four of the multiple futures will be present in the actual global environment of 2030.

DRIVERS

FUTURES

<p>FRICITION in international level decision making</p> <p>Economic INTEGRATION of globalised actors</p> <p>ASYMMETRY of wealth and power</p>	<p>DARK SIDE OF EXCLUSIVITY <i>(Integration, Climate Change, Resource Allocation, Changing State Capacity)</i> Weak and failed states generate instability in areas of interest, and the states of the globalised world are faced with related strategic choices.</p>
<p>CHANGING STATE CAPACITY and the distribution and management of power</p> <p>RESOURCE ALLOCATION of raw materials, energy, water and food</p>	<p>DECEPTIVE STABILITY <i>(Demographics, Resource Allocation, Friction)</i> Developed states preoccupied with societal change and demographic issues rather than geopolitical risk.</p>
<p>COMPETING IDEOLOGIES AND WORLD VIEWS</p> <p>CLIMATE CHANGE impacting international relations and commerce</p>	<p>CLASH OF MODERNITIES <i>(Use of Technology, Demographics, Competing Ideologies and Worldviews)</i> Advanced, rational networked societies with inherent fragility challenged by external authoritarian regimes.</p>
<p>USE OF TECHNOLOGY and innovation likely to produce breakthrough events</p> <p>DEMOGRAPHICS including migration and urbanisation</p>	<p>NEW POWER POLITICS <i>(Friction, Competing Ideologies and Worldviews, Resource Allocation, Integration)</i> Increasing number of major powers, competition and proliferation undermine value of international organisations.</p>

MFP examined common perceived threats to the populations of the Alliance, and found that the unpredictability and complexity of the future security environment will strain the Alliance's most powerful tools: strategic unity of values and ideas, solidarity among Allies, burden-sharing, and commitment to its decisions. Additionally, the study found that no nation can meet the challenges alone, and the credibility and capability of the Alliance depend on every nation doing its part.

STRATEGIC SURPRISES – THE CHALLENGE OF DISRUPTION Futures studies often have trouble dealing with non-linear developments such as systemic shocks. A systemic shock is an unforeseen event that shakes the entire, economic as well as political, system. It does not have to be a military event, but can stem from all of the domains of social and natural reality. Historical examples include the collapse of the Soviet Union and the tragic events of September 11, 2001.

Two shocks were considered in the study: A global pandemic and a WMD attack against a large city.

The Sources of Threat that contribute to create Risks conditions have been grouped in the model into six categories:

Super – empowered individuals

Extremist non –State actors

Organized Crime

Rogue States

Confrontational Powers

Nature

From the sources of threat the model derives Threatening actions and events.

- NATURAL DISASTERS

ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION

ATTACK WITH WMD/WME

CIVIL UNREST

CONTESTED POLITICAL LEGITIMACY

STRESS ON SOCIETAL STRUCTURES AND RULE OF LAW

ETHNIC TENSIONS

MASS WELFARE AND HEALTH STRESS

- CHALLENGING VALUES & WORLDVIEWS**
- UNANTICIPATED DISRUPTION OF ACCESS TO CRITICAL RESOURCES**
- DISRUPTION OF FLOW OF VITAL RESOURCES**
- HUMAN TRAFFICKING**
- HUMAN SECURITY, ETHNIC CLEANSING, GENOCIDE**
- VIOLATION OF PERSONAL LIBERTIES**
- ATTACK ON COMPUTER NETWORKS**
- ATTACK ON POPULATION OR INFRASTRUCTURE**
- SUBVERSION**
- TERRORISM**
- VIOLATION OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY**
- UNASSIMILATED POPULATION**
- DRUG TRAFFICKING**
- SPILL-OVER FROM UNANTICIPATED HUMANITARIAN CATASTROPHES & REGIONAL WARS**
- RISE OF NEW AND UNKNOWN ADVERSARIES**
- UNDERMINING OF DEFENCE PREPAREDNESS**
- UNANTICIPATED LARGE SCALE TERRORIST ATTACKS**
- PIRACY**
- STRESS ON SOCIETAL STRUCTURES AND RULE OF LAW**
- ETHNIC TENSIONS**
- ABUSE OF PANOPTICAL SURVEILLANCE**
- ATTACK BY CIVIL LIBERTY GROUPS**
- ESPIONAGE**
- ATTACK THROUGH ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM**
- TENSION AND INSTABILITY WITHIN AND BETWEEN DIFFERENT POLITICAL SYSTEMS FUELLED BY CHALLENGING BELIEF SYSTEMS**
- INFORMATION OPERATIONS BY NETWORKS WITH STRONG NON-STATE IDENTITY**
- INCREASED RELIANCE ON PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES (PMC)**
- PEOPLE OF THE STATE INTERESTED IN RETURNING TO PREVIOUS SPHERE OF INFLUENCE OVER STATE'S WISHES**
- GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY INSTABILITY AND CHALLENGES TO STANDARDS OF INTERACTION**
- NATION STATE SWITCHING ALLIANCE**

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

The MFP analyzed each of the four futures and associated Risk Conditions to find the Security Implications that would be generated when exploited by the Sources of Threat and the execution of a Threatening Action. The Security

Implications test the fundamental questions of NATO interests: “So what?” and “Why should NATO care?” Overall, the study derived 33 Security Implications that correspond to the four futures.

<u>DARK SIDE OF EXCLUSIVITY</u>	<u>DECEPTIVE STABILITY</u>	<u>CLASH OF MODERNITIES</u>	<u>NEW POWER POLITICS</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NEGATIVE IMPACT ON ECONOMY • ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION • HUMAN EXPLOITATION • ISSUE OF RIGHT/OBLIGATION TO INTERVENE • DANGER TO CITIZENS • VIOLATION OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY • LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND IDEAS AT RISK • NEGATIVE IMPACT ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE • DIFFUSION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY • ESTABILISATION OF PREVIOUSLY STABLE GOVERNMENTS • INCREASING NUMBER OF POTENTIALLY HOSTILE STATES • CHALLENGES TO DOMINANT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NEGATIVE IMPACT ON ECONOMY • DANGER TO CITIZENS • SOCIAL DISORDER • HUMAN EXPLOITATION • ORGANISED CRIME • VIOLATION OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY • LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND IDEAS AT RISK • ISSUE OF RIGHT/OBLIGATION TO INTERVENE • ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION • NEGATIVE IMPACT ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE • REDUCED WILL TO USE MILITARY POWER • REDUCED SELF-DEFENCE POSTURE • DECISIONS BY 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NEGATIVE IMPACT ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE • OVEREMPHASISED SECURITY VERSUS PERSONAL LIBERTIES TENSION • DANGER TO CITIZENS • NEGATIVE IMPACT ON ECONOMY • LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND IDEAS AT RISK • EXPLOITATION OF CORPORATE & STATE SECRETS • CHALLENGED STATE MONOPOLY ON THE USE OF FORCE (PMC) • ERODED STATE-SOCIETY COHESION • EXPLOITATION OF COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS • LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS • DECISIONS BY MULTINATIONAL INDUSTRIES CHALLENGE INTERNATIONAL ORDER 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> LARGE-SCALE WARFARE <input type="checkbox"/> NEGATIVE IMPACT ON ECONOMY <input type="checkbox"/> NEGATIVE IMPACT ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE <input type="checkbox"/> DANGER TO CITIZENS <input type="checkbox"/> VIOLATION OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY <input type="checkbox"/> LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND IDEAS AT RISK <input type="checkbox"/> ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION <input type="checkbox"/> HUMAN EXPLOITATION <input type="checkbox"/> ISSUE OF RIGHT/OBLIGATION TO INTERVENE <input type="checkbox"/> DEVASTATION CAUSED BY WMD/WME <input type="checkbox"/> REDUCED ABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL NATIONS OR IOS TO INFLUENCE OR MANAGE CRISIS/EVENTS

<p>VALUES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDERMINING NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW • POPULATION HOSTILITY AND UNREST • DOMESTIC DISORDER 	<p>MULTINATIONAL INDUSTRY CHALLENGES INTERNATIONAL ORDER</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ASYMMETRIC SECURITY ENV 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DISRUPTION OF VITAL RESOURCE FLOWS • UNCERTAIN ALLEGIANCE OF PMCS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> ASYMMETRIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT <input type="checkbox"/> DISRUPTION OF VITAL RESOURCE FLOWS <input type="checkbox"/> ERODED COHESION OF EXISTING ALLIANCES
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These Security Implications were presented and discussed at workshops and roundtables. Participants were asked to rate each Security Implication for both likelihood and impact on a scale of 1 to 4 (4 being the higher likelihood and greater impact). The resulting importance indicator for each Security Implication was determined by multiplying the average likelihood by the average impact. In addition to that, participants rated each Security Implication with regard to transformational difficulty, adding a third aspect to analysis. These were given scores for ranking and plurality, which were then summed to determine final scores. This resulted in the identification of the Top 5 Security Implications that resonated with the participating audience:

TOP SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

- 1. ASYMMETRIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT**
- 2. DISRUPTION OF VITAL RESOURCE FLOWS**
- 3. NEGATIVE IMPACT ON ECONOMY**
- 4. EXPLOITATION OF COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS**
- 5. ISSUE OF RIGHT/OBLIGATION TO INTERVENE**

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

The final step in the futures process spotlights Military Implications by asking the overarching question: “How and for what should the militaries of the Alliance prepare in the future?” These Implications result directly from the Risk Conditions and Security Implications already discussed.

Twenty-six Military Implications were deduced and further refined using the analytic principles of the ‘Five Operational Functions’: Command, Sense, Act, Shield, and Sustain (CSASS)⁶. Twenty-one workshops helped develop and analyze the Implications, with the goal to better understand each Implication

and its relative effects on the Alliance. Specifically, the process clarified what may need to change militarily in the Alliance as we look towards 2030, as well as potential new areas of engagement that would have particular consequence for military operations. Figure 6 shows how the Military Implications connect to the four futures.

<u>DARK SIDE OF EXCLUSIVITY</u>	<u>DECEPTIVE STABILITY</u>	<u>CLASH OF MODERNITIES</u>	<u>NEW POWER POLITICS</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> CONDUCT DETERRENCE OPERATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> CONDUCT EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS TO PROTECT LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> PREVENT THE DISRUPTION OF FLOW OF VITAL RESOURCES <input type="checkbox"/> SUPPORT COUNTER-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS <input type="checkbox"/> PROTECT CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONDUCT COLLECTIVE FULL SPECTRUM DEFENCE OPERATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> CONDUCT EXP OPS IN SUPPORT OF HUMANITARIAN 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IDENTIFY EMERGING FOREIGN SECURITY THREATS • PROVIDE AID TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES • CONDUCT COLLECTIVE FULL SPECTRUM DEFENCE OPERATIONS • CONDUCT DETERRENCE OPERATIONS • CONDUCT EXP OPS IN SUPPORT OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE • SUPPORT SHAPING OF SECURITY ENVIRONMENT • ADAPT RECRUITMENT PROCESSES • ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE USE OF NON-LETHAL FORCE • SUPPORT & 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> PROTECT C4 SYSTEMS AND MILITARY NETWORKS <input type="checkbox"/> PREVENT THE DISRUPTION OF FLOW OF VITAL RESOURCES <input type="checkbox"/> CONDUCT EXP OPS TO PROTECT LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> PROTECT CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONDUCT DETERRENCE OPERATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> CONDUCT COLLECTIVE FULL SPECTRUM DEFENCE OPERATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> MITIGATE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES <input type="checkbox"/> PROTECT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> CONDUCT DETERRENCE OPERATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> PROTECT CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE <input type="checkbox"/> SUPPORT COUNTER-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS <input type="checkbox"/> CONDUCT COLLECTIVE FULL SPECTRUM DEFENCE OPERATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> CONDUCT EXP OPS IN SUPPORT OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE <input type="checkbox"/> CONDUCT EXP OPS TO PROTECT LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> PREVENT THE DISRUPTION OF FLOW OF VITAL RESOURCES <input type="checkbox"/> PROTECT C4 SYSTEMS AND MILITARY

<p>ASSISTANCE</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> PROVIDE AID TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES <input type="checkbox"/> ENHANCE CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> ADDRESS THE PRESENCE OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES <input type="checkbox"/> PROTECT AGAINST ASYMMETRIC THREATS <input type="checkbox"/> CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS <input type="checkbox"/> CONDUCT COHERENT INFORMATION OPERATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN COHERENT COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK <input type="checkbox"/> CLARIFYING ROE IN ALLIANCE OPERATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> INTERVENE TO PREVENT ESCALATION (FORCE PROJECTION) <input type="checkbox"/> PROVIDE MILITARY 	<p>COOPERATE WITH MULTIPLE ACTORS IN MULTI-NATIONAL RESPONSE EFFORTS TO NATURAL DISASTERS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PROVIDE MILITARY LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES 	<p>AGAINST ASYMMETRIC THREATS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> PROTECT ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM <input type="checkbox"/> TRAIN INDIGENOUS FORCES <input type="checkbox"/> ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE PRESENCE OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES <input type="checkbox"/> CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN A COHERENT COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK 	<p>NETWORKS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> MITIGATE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES <input type="checkbox"/> PROTECT ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM <input type="checkbox"/> PROTECT AGAINST ASYMMETRIC THREATS <input type="checkbox"/> TRAIN INDIGENOUS FORCES <input type="checkbox"/> CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN A COHERENT COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK <input type="checkbox"/> INTERVENE TO PREVENT ESCALATION (FORCE PROJECTION) <input type="checkbox"/> PROVIDE MILITARY LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES
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<p>LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> TRAIN INDIGENOUS FORCES</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> SUPPORT & COOPERATE WITH MULTIPLE ACTORS IN MULTI-NATIONAL RESPONSE EFFORTS TO NATURAL DISASTERS</p>			
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At the workshops, quantitative data were collected to support analysis of the individual implications. Participants were asked to rate each Military Implication for likelihood and impact on a scale of 1 to 4 (4 being the higher likelihood and greater impact). The resulting indicator for each Implication was determined by multiplying the average likelihood by the average impact. In addition to that, participants rated each Implication with regards to transformational difficulty, adding a third variable to the analysis. These were given scores for ranking and plurality, which were then summed to determine final scores, resulting in the identification of the Top 5 Military Implications that resonated most strongly with the audience:

The primary concern among all national subject-matter-experts who participated in the MFP was protecting the populations of the Alliance, especially their interests and values. Future adversaries intent on destroying our societies and values will be innovative in exploiting advanced technologies as they confront the Alliance in ways that will seem asymmetric to us. In response, the Alliance will have to adjust quickly to the specific nature of these asymmetric attacks.

TOP MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

1. PROTECT AGAINST ASYMMETRIC THREATS

- 2. CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS
- 3. PROTECT C4 SYSTEMS AND MILITARY NETWORKS
- 4. PREVENT THE DISRUPTION AND FLOW OF VITAL RESOURCES
- 5. ENHANCE CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS	ANALYSIS
<i>PROTECT AGAINST ASYMMETRIC THREATS</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop adaptable command structures that can quickly respond to a variety of modes of warfare and support civilian authorities • Anticipate vulnerabilities and potential threats through continuous, effective intelligence information-sharing with all who may be called on to act • Promote awareness of potential threats among populations, and pro-active measures through training and experimentation • Be prepared to both support and lead according to the magnitude of attacks and the effectiveness of civilian responses • Prepare responses that are unrestricted across the full spectrum of warfare and stability operations.
<i>CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST NON STATE ACTORS</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop a well defined Commanders' intent and clearly established common Rules of Engagement (ROE) for all forces involved

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interact with local population to gain cultural and situational awareness and build/maintain support for the mission
<i>PROTECT C4 SYSTEMS AND NETWORKS</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop a strategic concept for Cyber Defence • Leverage technological advances to both develop and improve capabilities to detect, identify, locate & engage source(s) of cyber attacks • Develop offensive cyber capabilities (Counter-Cyber Attack) • Avoid development or reliance on single point of failure systems and networks.
<i>PREVENT DISRUPTIONS TO THE FLOW OF VITAL RESOURCES</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify resources and corresponding infrastructures that are deemed vital to the Alliance and its member nations • Develop a concept and legal framework to ensure the Alliance has the ability and resources to respond to threats aimed at preventing the flow of vital resources. The location and type of resources and infrastructure will be the key drivers that define needed capabilities • Establish communication and coordination with civil authorities to assist in crisis planning.
<i>ENHANCE CIVIL-MILITARY</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prepare for increased involvement

COOPERATION	<p>of NGOs in areas of tension, crisis and conflict</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop framework for comprehensive planning and liaison with NGOs
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Comments to develop in this annex:

The questions to be developed with respect to ESDP ambition by 2030 are: What are the military implications listed in pages 19 to 22 that will affect more specifically EU by 2030? Can the top military implications of page 22 and its analysis be applied to the EU as well? How can systemic shocks more likely affect EU ambitions?

To what extent are top military implications - as depicted in this document - applicable to the EU?

1. *Protection against asymmetric threats.*

This implication should be taken into account by Europe, whose borders are a perfect example of potentially conflict-generating political, cultural, social and economic asymmetries.

Immigration to European countries is one of the main sources of external and internal asymmetry that can generate growing tensions due to illegal flows or lack of societal integration.

It must be recalled that the terrorism of Islamic origin has repeatedly announced its intention of taking Europe - and the Iberian Peninsula especially - as an objective of terrorism and final domination.

Therefore, Europe is a very sensitive area to asymmetric threats that, consequently, should develop a high degree of protection to this type of threats.

2. Conduct military operations against non-state actors.

This top military implication is related to the previous one. Protection against asymmetric threats - as some non-state actors - can require to suppress their sources of support through the use of military force. Therefore, the European Union has to consider the possibility of conducting military operations against this type of actors.

Piracy is already in our very present landscape.

3. Protect C4 systems and military networks.

No significant differences between Europe and other World regions.

4. Prevent disruptions to the flow of vital resources.

The European dependence on other regions in a number of resources such as energy and many other raw materials, and the criticality of some of them, contribute to the high sensitivity of the European Union in this matter.

5. Enhance civil-military cooperation.

Civil-military cooperation proves to be essential for controlling the flow of illegal migration and for the solution of conflicts as well as for the provision of aid to highly unstable areas such as some African regions or areas prone to natural disasters, such as some Latin American countries.

List of military Implications.

Within the general list of military implications (26), we may consider that at least twenty-one, without making distinction to which future they belong, are eligible to affect the EU by the 2030 landscape, namely:

Conduct expeditionary operations to protect lines of communication.

Prevent the disruption of flow of vital resources.

Support counter-proliferation efforts.

Conduct exp ops in support of humanitarian assistance.

Provide aid to civil authorities.

Enhance civil-military operations.

Address the presence of private military companies.

Protect against asymmetric threats.

Operations against non state actors.

Conduct coherent information ops.

Conduct ops in coherent comprehensive framework.

Clarifying ROE in alliance ops.

Intervene to prevent escalation. (force projection)

Provide military logistic support to humanitarian activities.

Train indigenous forces.

Support & cooperate with multiple actors in multinational response efforts to natural disasters.

Identifying emerging foreign security threats.

Adequately address the use of non-lethal force.

Protect C4 systems and military networks.

Mitigate negative impact of disruptive technologies.

Protect electromagnetic spectrum.

Despite of the fact that by 2030 the EU might not be involved in high intensity large scale operations according to level of ambition expectations, it should be able to conduct all the spectrum of defensive and defensive operations with limited expeditionary reach, tailored to the progress in achieving the required capabilities.

How can systemic shocks more likely affect EU ambitions?

By definition, systemic shocks come up by surprise and their nature is not previously known. Therefore, all we can do about them is to make an effort in trying to analyse the factors that could lead to such situations and have the necessary flexibility to react to them as soon and as efficiently as possible.

Since all four 2030 future scenarios are possible and some of them can be totally or partially simultaneous, they will demand such a large range of capacities that the reaction to most of the eventual systemic shocks directly related to the Defence should be essentially covered by our resources and mechanisms.

The wide variety of areas where systemic shocks can surge make extremely difficult to imagine how they can affect EU ambitions. So far we have the example of a major change affecting one of the world great powers (the fall of the Soviet Empire), a daring terrorist attack to the USA, and the fall of the World financial system; each of them of a totally different nature as compared to the others. Should a systemic shock affect home security or well-being, there will be a serious psychological effect on the population and a change in the allocation of resources, thus limiting the public support to EU ambitions in the field of Defence. Recruitment will also sway accordingly. As to systemic shocks affecting the strategic status quo, they will pose a challenge to the present European Defence attitude.

Final Reflexions on the MFP annex

If we want to proceed on the construction of the security and defence of Europe, we shall have to make use of three assets provided by the Lisbon Treaty: a new more agile and efficient organic structure - reinforced by some organisations

making it more rational and powerful -, the European Defence Agency, and a permanent structured cooperation that pulls the chariot. We still could add a fourth one: a renewed political will with respect to the ESDP. The key factor as far as the concrete definition of the necessary capacities will be the efficient operation of the Agency.

To be able to come up with the type of capacities that the European defence should count on, we can set up a mechanism consisting on three successive objectives or steps, the first one being to complete and improve all what we already decided to do and what was initiated; that is, recovering from our present standstill and be able to fulfil our present engagements. We can tag this step as “making it better”.

The second step is to move forward towards what was agreed in Lisbon, that is, acquiring the capacities demanded by the “extended Petersberg missions”, that will allow us to set going the new mechanisms offered by the Treaty in order to reach the ten-year horizon in good conditions. The EU document drawn up by the Vasconcelos team can be most useful, since it contains some quite well-aimed guidelines and some interesting proposals, mainly in organisational and functional aspects, but also in what has to do with essential programmes.

But we are looking at the 2030 horizon, that is, twenty years ahead, as it is envisaged by the document issued by the Nato’s Transformation Command, and consequently, we are bound to consider a higher degree of globalisation, including a bipolar or even multipolar leadership. Therefore, some of the scenarios presented by the Nato’s document will require to have higher capacities available, including the necessary assets to successfully fight a conventional war and even a confrontation where nuclear weapons could be utilised. At this point, it would be difficult for Europe not to get involved in these types of conflict.

The end result points to a wide diversity of missions and necessary capacities, and to a situation far more serious than it is now. This simply means that we have fallen back in many and important aspects of our security.

The necessary capacities include the capability of fulfilling the extended Petersberg missions. Consequently, we shall have to have sufficient, adequate and easily available deployment means organised as a European Air Transport Fleet; adequate equipment for self-protection permitting to move around in the best security conditions, avoiding the harassment of our bases by enemy fire or using of mines and portable anti-aircraft weapons or distorting our communication systems, equipment for the suppression of risks in coastal waters; a sufficient number of helicopters to overcome the present scarcity of this type of aircraft; robots for logistic, protection, surveillance, reconnaissance and some attack functions, among which UAV,s; simulators permitting the

acceleration of training processes and recycling processes; an improved intelligence - including human intel , that needs a special consideration -; the development of a high priority system of cyber-security; renewed air support; and accurate combat assets permitting decisive action. It will also be necessary to continue developing and improving civil-military cooperation. In the rearguard, we must adopt a clear and firm language when we talk about defence; look after the “defence culture” of our population and its knowledge of issues related to world conflicts so as to insure its support to our efforts, avoiding of course the effects of the “counter-culture”. We must also make sure that we get the necessary number of soldiers and civilian personnel.

The next step would consist on figuring out when we have to start acquiring the extra capacities that Europe needs as she faces the 2030 horizon: something like backing up in time as much as necessary, because we might need to start making some provisions already. For example, we might have to get ourselves organised for the extended Petersberg missions in such a way that we are ready to evolve to more classical forces should them be necessary in the future. At any rate, political will shall have to overcome the obstacles of an economic crisis and its material and psychological consequences.

Consequently, we should make sure that we have the capacity for adapting our defence set up to the different situations by making use of the necessary foresight and a good organic flexibility. Also we should not neglect areas that, like CBRN, may seem less useful at a certain moment. We also must make sure that we have the capability to identify and track weapons of mass destruction, and identify, deter and defeat certain non-state actors. Our industrial base must stay alert so that it does not get too late to the changing needs. The protection of our cyber systems will be essential. Procedures will be established to disarm potential cyber-enemies should the occasion arrive. Space must be seen as a habitual dimension of defence which we should take as much advantage of as possible, mainly in matters of surveillance and intelligence. We should also profit from our technological revolution to gain advantage over our potential adversaries, but we must not rely on it too much, since the “weak” part of the asymmetric confrontation will know how to take advantage of it. We cannot delay the necessary actions to make sure that we have the political will and get the support of the population, because they are critical assets, both of them. And together with the military and political aspects of the problems we must always include those related to the media.

As we face the 2030 horizon we must try to get the habit of working with countries from other regions of the world and that we establish sound interoperative procedures allowing us to make multilaterality and efficiency compatible. We must also look for any occasion that allows us to create a web of relations that make more and more difficult the possibility of a confrontations

and more and more likely that the principles supporting world peace remain effective.

We should not leave apart eventual “tsunamis” originated by “systemic shocks”, as well as some foreseeable conflicts, such as the one that can break out as a consequence of the Iranian and North Korean challenges or as a result of an eventual crisis of the dual Chinese system. This means that the continuity of the present security situation can be altered much sooner than it is generally expected (that is, within the next twenty years or even before the next ten years). Should this occur, the demand of some determined capacities can move closer to today in our schedule. We must not be too naives with respect to this.

As we can see, in spite of the provisions concerning civilian contributions, the multiplicity of missions demanding a military presence is bound to be so much ample all together that the recruitment of volunteers may become a critical problem.

The question really - and we must take it into account as we are facing the future - that we can run into serious difficulties as we try to acquire the capacities that we need in a context of budget limitations and with a war in Afghanistan. We should not forget, either, the existing possibility of a scarce availability of military personnel, because in many of our countries the attitude of the society is less and less ready, not only to fight if necessary, but also to endure the sacrifices demanded to a soldier and, to a certain degree, to the civilian personnel as well. Not to mention that, even though we envisage serious limitations as far the budget is concerned, we can expect that the crisis shall come to an end sooner or later, and, at that time, recruitment will get more difficult again.

A very important consideration has still to be made: European Defence will keep running into difficulties as long as the Union is unable to define a foreign policy of its own, even for the most conflictive areas. The lack of a common foreign and security policy will always be an obstacle to surmount and a key difficulty when we try to determine our necessary security and defence capabilities.

Annex EDA

Comments on capabilities and symmetry or asymmetry with EDA study on both the Vasconcelos document and the MFP:

The document “An Initial Long Term Vision European Defence capability and capacity needs” was issued in October 2006. The other two documents we have used as a reference (MFP and Ambitions 2020) were issued in 2009. As we comment the EDA,s study, one of the first aspects to consider is the influence of the time gap among all three references, and also the different horizons set up for each of them: 2020 for Ambitions. 2030 for scenarios, and 2026 for capabilities (two decades 2006, date of publication).

The defence capabilities that Europe will have in 20 years time depend on the technological and industrial base available at that time, and this is a factor requiring strategic preparation and vision, but also - and this is still more important - on the commitments of the EU member states to meet the challenges of scenarios and related missions. A correct EDA´s vision without members commitment to fulfill goals, or even the lack of goal definition, will increase the gap between means and ends that impedes the EU to play an adequate role as global actor.

The document states quite clearly that it only tries to identify the most relevant and robust trends to help those who are working their way into the fog of the future. It is an initial vision; a compass bearing that can be changed if, for example, systemic shocks disrupt the trends. The document takes into account the Headline Goal and the European Security Strategy, which envisage the separation of warring factions by force, or stabilization operations in a failed state in the case of a capable asymmetric threat.

The sort of world that the document presents for 2025 - as globalization goes on and makes winners and losers and demographic trends contribute to make disparities even more apparent - depicts a less preeminent Europe surrounded by unstable regions Africa and the Middle East, with public finances under pressure and societies extremely cautious about legitimacy in the use of force and inclined to favor security over defence spending.

Other drivers interaction lead to scenarios similar to the one proposed by the MFP, but we can dare to say that the 2025 scenario of EDA is even darker than the one of MFP for 2030. There are three aspects worth to mention that mark a significant difference of stress with MFP:

Defence is perceived as peripheral to the primary security concerns of European citizens; the changing role of force and the adaptation to the technological revolution.

The first is aligned with the definition of the Deceptive Stability scenario in MFP.

The changing role of force refers to the continuous interplay between the political, the military and the media aspects of the game where military success can mean political failure. Also, to the restrictions about the conditions on which the use military force is deemed legitimate. The result is that operations are frequently carried out under very constrained rules of engagement in opaque circumstances and against an opponent concealed amongst the civilian population.

Despite the continued development in communication, sensing technologies and micro electronics, our potential adversary will work hard to exploit our advances against us. (How much can damage be eliminated from military operations. Casualties seen as a negligence.), Protection against new forms of biological agents, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on the dark side, will be a permanent concern.

Defence shall not renounce to R&D but will increasingly depend on the flood of civil technological progress to keep pace with challenges.

Technology will no longer be seen as a clear advantage to EU forces due to the expansion of knowledge and technology; a fact that is endemic to open societies and global economy.

The implications perceived by the EDA study for the ECSDP operations and capabilities by 2025 are (ECSDP: European Common Security and Defence Policy; named according with the Lisbon Treaty):

Operations will be expeditionary, multinational and multi-instrument, and in some cases they shall take place in austere areas of operations. They will be

built under a comprehensive approach concept combining hard and soft power instruments. Sometimes as interventions by force to break the cycle of violence. The objective is more to gain stability than victory. Operations will use more intelligence (information and knowledge) than kinetic energy (precision weapons and quantity). Asymmetric warfare must be seen more as a divergence of goals to be achieved and rules to be observed (Law of Armed conflict and proportionality of force) than as the unbalance of technologies.

With respect to capabilities, there is the need of balancing two approaches: “learning from history” (doctrine, training, leadership) and adaptability and flexibility to keep the speed of changes. The study defines areas of primary attention: Sinergy, Agility, Selectivity and Sustainability.

Sinergy includes coordination of effects with non military actors.

Agility means speed of reaction and deployability.

Selectivity means a wide range of available capabilities.

Sustainability means an adequate logistic support and theatre access.

There are several considerations to be made by defence planners looking at the horizon of 2025: Knowledge exploitation as a fundamental resource; Interoperability among Member States forces; Manpower Balance with an effective proportion of deployable forces to reduce costs; Rapid Acquisition (R&T versus off the shelf proportion); Industrial Policy consolidating technological and industrial base and increasing investment to compete with the US; Flexibility for the unforeseen recognizing prospective limitations into the future.

These implications are translated into a Future capability Profile for each of the main capabilities domains:

Future capabilities profile (source EDA)

Command

Streamlined Command and Control organisation (decisive)

Clear and standardised procedures

Secure and efficient command support

Ability to communicate with partners at all levels

Ability to plug in to joint and combined HQ

Capability for situational awareness

Inform

Ability to collect, process, select, share, disseminate, retrieve and store accessible information

Inter-departmental and inter-agency information

Engage

Deny or possibly control the sea, land, air and space domains.

Precision, high speed, engagement capabilities

Range of capabilities from physical destruction to non-lethal

Minimising collateral damage

Precise and selective targeting

Consideration of space related aspects

Detection and identification of potential threats in advance

Reduce casualties amongst friendly forces, partners and civilian population

When possible, reduce impact of military operations on natural environment

Protect

Surveillance and advanced alarm capability

Ability to detect illegal weapons

Ability to recover stranded personnel

Safeguard networks and the area of operations against both physical and cyber attacks

Preventing proliferation

Counter employment of MWD (CBRN capability)

Deploy

Strategic deployability (air transport, in-flight refuelling, sea transport, overland force projection assets)

Intra- theatre mobility (land mobility, tactical air transport and air mobility)

Sustain

Provision, replacement and rotation of personnel

Multinational logistic component to reduce logistic footprint

Ensure sustainability for a limited period of time by utilising organic assets

Harmonisation of logistic requirement procedures

Open summary of conclusions at this stage of the draft:

The level of ambition defined by the EU Institute of Security Studies shows a clear ambition into the future open to progress according to a pragmatic approach, but limited within the 2020 horizon to the expansion of the Petersberg Missions.

MFP scenarios give a good perspective of possible futures that can be dramatically influenced by systemic shocks. Most military implications derived from them, except those related to EU Defense are to be considered to determine capabilities.

EDA Long- Term vision for capability needs is consistent with ambitions and futures, and in some respects, even more demanding in relation to the role of force and technology. The EDA "Work Programme 2010" further develops in some detail long- term strategies as well as prioritized actions arising from CPD (Capability Development Plan) and other policies and related initiatives. EDA's mission is to support the ECSDP and EU Member Nations through analysis of future needs and long-term vision, rather than to decide, commit resources or convert these studies into cooperation or programmes.

At this stage of the game, when we are awaiting the opinion of other participants on what we have developed so far, we leave some questions open: for example, deficiencies already observed in capabilities, or to whom belongs the responsibility to obtain them, or how much the gap between ends and

means is deepening. However, it becomes apparent that the analysis side does not seem to be the weakest side of the problem.